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Who Are They to Judge?: The Constitutionality of 
Delegations by Courts to Probation Officers 
Mark Thomson 
In 2009, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas sentenced Maurice Turpin to fifty-seven 
months in prison and three years of supervised release for 
transporting an unlawful alien.1 As a condition of supervised 
release, the District Court ordered Turpin to participate in 
mental health and anger management programs ―as deemed 
necessary and approved by the probation officer.‖2  
Orders delegating discretionary authority to probation of-
ficers are not uncommon. Oftentimes, the delegation implicates 
liberty interests arguably even more substantial than that at 
issue for Turpin. In one case, for example, a district court dele-
gated to a probation officer the power to determine a probation-
er‘s right to visit with his son and grandson unsupervised.3 In 
another, a judge delegated to a probation officer the power to 
decide whether a defendant could possess a computer.4 
Like a growing number of defendants, Turpin appealed the 
order in his case on grounds that the district court had imper-
missibly delegated its judicial authority to a non-judicial offic-
er.5 His argument, essentially, was that the Constitution re-
quires that certain decisions be made exclusively by Article III 
judicial officers, meaning courts may not delegate those deci-
sions to non-Article III officials.6 
 
  J.D. University of Minnesota Law School 2012. With thanks to my 
Mom and Dad, Professor Kristin Hickman, and the members of the Minnesota 
Law Review. Copyright © 2011 by Mark Thomson. 
 1. See United States v. Turpin, 393 F. App‘x 172, 173 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. United States v. Bowman, 175 F. App‘x 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 4. United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 5. Turpin, 393 F. App‘x at 173. 
 6. Id. 
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Turpin‘s appeal posed a problem for the Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, since there is no judicial consensus as to when courts may 
constitutionally delegate their authority to probation officers.7 
Though a majority of the federal courts of appeal have consi-
dered the constitutionality of delegations of probationary au-
thority by the judiciary, their decisions have resulted in a pro-
nounced and ongoing circuit split.8 
This Note considers the different approaches taken by the 
circuit courts in evaluating judicial delegations of power to pro-
bation officers. Part I lays out the various standards that the 
circuit courts have applied to determine whether a delegation 
by a court to a probation officer is constitutional. Part II ana-
lyzes those standards and identifies a number of flaws in each. 
Part III argues that courts would improve jurisprudence in this 
area of the law by abandoning the current, multi-test frame-
work in favor of the standard used by the Supreme Court to 
evaluate delegations of Article I power. Doing so would engen-
der greater doctrinal consistency and coherence, promote judi-
cial economy, and, ultimately, improve fairness to parties. 
I.  CURRENT LAW ON JUDICIAL DELEGATIONS TO 
PROBATION OFFICERS   
The judicial system is at a crossroads in its growing depen-
dence on probation officers. Increasingly, courts delegate au-
thority to probation officers in order to manage the growing 
number and variety of sentences imposed in criminal cases,9 
but probationers often challenge such delegations as violative 
of Article III‘s Vesting Clause.10 Although reviewing courts 
have devised a number of judicial tests to balance these con-
flicting imperatives, the tests are inconsistent and the results, 
accordingly, uneven and difficult to reconcile. The current state 
 
 7. Id. at 173–74 (recognizing there is currently a circuit split on the issue). 
 8. Compare Bowman, 175 F. App‘x at 838 (upholding delegation of au-
thority to a probation officer against an Article III challenge), and United 
States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 2006) (same), and Wein-
berger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 359–61 (6th Cir. 2001) (same), with 
United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (overturning delega-
tion of authority to probation officer as a violation of Article III), and United 
States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2005) (same), and United 
States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995) (same). 
 9. See United States v. Burnette, 980 F. Supp. 1429, 1432–33 (M.D. Ala. 
1997) (asserting that the probation officer functions as the ―supervisory ‗arm 
of the court‘‖). 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 695, 698, 700 (10th Cir. 
2011); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 308 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:306 
 
of the law regarding judicial delegations stands in marked con-
trast to the situation surrounding constitutional challenges to 
delegations of legislative authority, with respect to which 
courts today have the benefit of a nearly universally accepted 
standard for review. 
A. PROBATION OFFICERS AS EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS 
Federal probation officers operate under the supervision of 
the federal judiciary and serve the courts.11 They are not, how-
ever, part of the Article III judiciary, for the simple reason that 
they do not actually decide—or help to decide—cases or contro-
versies.12 Instead, probation officers perform a quintessentially 
executive function: enforcing court orders and judgments.13 Un-
like Article III judges, whose jobs require neutrality, probation 
officers are generally adversarial to defendants, in the same 
way that police officers, prosecutors, and other executive 
branch officials are adversarial to defendants.14 Probation offi-
cers might be an ―arm of the federal judiciary,‖15 but they are 
fundamentally executive—not judicial—officials.16  
B. DELEGATION TO PROBATION OFFICERS AS THE MODERN 
NORM 
The criminal justice system relies heavily on probation of-
ficers.17 As the Fourth Circuit recognized, ―to remain efficient, 
[district courts] must be able to rely as extensively as possible 
on the support services of probation officers.‖18 Courts routinely 
 
 11. See Probation and Pretrial Services - Mission, U.S. COURTS, http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/ProbationPretrialServices/Mission.aspx ( last 
visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
 12. See Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974) (explaining that 
the Constitution‘s reference to ―‗judicial power‘ embraces application of prin-
ciples of law or equity to facts, distilled by hearings or by stipulations‖). 
 13. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 651 (9th ed. 2011) (defining ―executive 
power‖ as ―the power to see that laws are duly executed and enforced‖). 
 14. Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the 
Federal Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2010). 
 15. See U.S. COURTS, supra note 11. 
 16. Bascuas, supra note 14, at 59 (contending that although a probation 
officer ―formally or technically works for the Judicial Branch,‖ the officer 
―serves as nothing less than the court‘s inquisitor‖). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1435 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (―[P]robation officers therefore ‗are virtually indispensable.‘‖); see 
also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1949). 
 18. United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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delegate a wide range of functions to probation officers.19 Some-
times, the delegated function is relatively simple and entails 
the exercise of only minimal discretion by the probation officer, 
as where a district court orders a probation officer to collect 
DNA samples from a probationer.20 In other instances, the 
court delegates much greater authority or discretion to the pro-
bation officer. For example, district courts have granted proba-
tion officers broad discretion in determining whether and 
where to allow a probationer to travel,21 whether to require a 
probationer to notify third parties of his criminal background,22 
and whether, when, and where to administer random drug 
tests.23 
Allowing courts to delegate these functions is essential to 
the smooth functioning of the judicial system,24 especially given 
the high number of probationers and parolees—over 
119,00025—in the federal system today. Requiring courts to 
oversee the particularities of every probation would impose a 
significant strain on judicial resources.26 Thus, Congress has 
given courts broad authority to delegate powers and responsi-
bilities to probation officers.27 
C. ARTICLE III‘S VESTING CLAUSE AND LIMITS ON DELEGATION 
OF JUDICIAL POWER 
Though the judiciary routinely delegates authority to pro-
bation officers, defendants continue to assert that the practice 
 
 19. See HILDA L. SOLIS, U.S. DEP‘T OF LABOR & KEITH HALL, U.S. BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 242 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.bls.gov/oco/reprints/ooh003.pdf. 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 21. United States v. Stanphill, 146 F.3d 1221, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 22. United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2001).  
 23. United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 25. See LAUREN E. GLAZE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBA-
TION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 23, 33 (2010). 
 26. United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 22 n.6 (1st Cir. 2004) (―As a prac-
tical matter, moreover, many district courts must rely on probation services to 
ensure the efficient administration of justice in criminal cases.‖); United 
States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (―[F]ederal district courts 
cannot be expected to police every defendant to the extent that a probation of-
ficer is capable of doing.‖). 
 27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3603(10) (2006) (―A probation officer 
shall . . . perform any other duty that the court may designate.‖). 
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violates Article III, § 1 of the Constitution.28 Article III, § 1, al-
so known as Article III‘s Vesting Clause, states that, ―The judi-
cial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.‖29 As interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, the Vesting Clause bars delegations of the judi-
cial power to non-judicial officers.30 This interpretation is 
known as the Article III nondelegation principle.31 
The nondelegation principle serves two purposes.32 First, it 
is a corollary to the Constitution‘s separation of powers, rooted 
in the concern that delegation by one branch of its powers to 
another branch threatens the balance of powers.33 To keep the 
branches separate and co-equal, and thus functioning effective-
ly as checks on each other, courts and scholars—echoing the 
Founding Fathers—have posited that certain responsibilities 
should be exercised only by specific branches (i.e. should not be 
delegable).34 Consistent with Article III‘s Vesting Clause, the 
Supreme Court has said that separation of powers prohibits 
courts from delegating ―essential attributes of the judicial  
power.‖35 
In the context of Article III, the nondelegation principle al-
so ―preserves to litigants their interest in an impartial and in-
dependent federal adjudication of claims within the judicial 
power of the United States.‖36 The impartiality and indepen-
 
 28. United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 695 (10th Cir. 2011) (challenging 
the constitutionality of a court‘s grant of authority to a probation officer); 
United States v. Torres-Pindan, 400 F. App‘x 839, 841 (5th Cir. 2010) (same), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2960 (2011); United States v. Scalise, 398 F. App‘x 736, 
742 (3d Cir. 2010) (same), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1585 (2011). 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 30. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50, 58–59 (1982) (―The inexorable command of [Article III, § 1] is clear and de-
finite: The judicial power of the United States must be exercised by courts 
having the attributes prescribed in Art. III.‖). 
 31. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 
327, 352 (2002). 
 32. See Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 33. See, e.g., Darren Summerville, The Nondelegation Doctrine After Whit-
man v. American Trucking Associations: Constitutional Precedent Breathes a 
Sigh of Relief, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 627, 662 (2001) (―[T]he nondelegation doc-
trine is cemented by separation of powers concerns . . . .‖). 
 34. See Chadha v. I.N.S., 634 F.2d 408, 420–26 (9th Cir. 1981), aff ’d, 
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 35. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). 
 36. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 
(1986). 
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dence of the judiciary are secured through Article III‘s protec-
tions of judicial salary and tenure—protections unique, at the 
federal level, to the judiciary.37 Furthermore, because Article 
III judges are appointed from a national pool after careful con-
sideration by the President and Senate, they are arguably, as a 
group, more competent than non-Article III judges to determine 
defendants‘ rights.38  
D. TESTS USED BY COURTS TO EVALUATE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATIONS TO PROBATION OFFICERS  
The Supreme Court has held that sentencing is fundamen-
tally a judicial power.39 As a judicial power, it falls within Ar-
ticle III‘s nondelegation principle. Because setting terms of 
probation is one manner of sentencing,40 the power to set terms 
of probation is also nondelegable, meaning only Article III 
judges may exercise it.41 
But this seemingly clear analysis has given rise to a very 
unclear jurisprudence. Considerable uncertainty exists about 
what sorts of decisions fall within the ambit of ―sentencing‖ and 
what sorts of grants of power constitute delegations. When re-
solving claims of unconstitutional delegations, courts typically 
 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467, 472–75 (Al-
exander Hamilton) (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (arguing that life tenure for Ar-
ticle III judges is essential to ensure their fairness and impartiality); Lloyd N. 
Cutler, The Limits of Advice and Consent, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 876, 877 (1990) 
(noting that the prohibition against diminishing judicial salary is one means of 
assuring ―the appearance of judicial independence and impartiality‖). 
 38. See Akhil Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1509 (1990); David Pimentel, Reframing the In-
dependence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure in Light of 
Judges’ Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 16 n.56 (2009); see also 
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977) (op-
posing the notion that ―federal and state trial courts are equally competent 
forums for the enforcement of federal constitutional rights‖). 
 39. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41 (1916) (―Indisputably under 
our constitutional system the right to try offences against the criminal laws 
and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judi-
cial . . . .‖). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b)(1) (2008) (identifying ―a term of probation‖ as a 
type of sentence). 
 41. See, e.g., Whitehead v. United States, 155 F.2d 460, 462 (6th Cir. 
1946) (―Fixing the terms and conditions of probation is a judicial act which 
may not be delegated.‖). 
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look to either of two judicial tests: the ―core judicial functions‖ 
test 42 or the ―ultimate authority‖ test.43  
1. The Core Judicial Functions Test 
Courts applying the core judicial functions test distinguish 
between powers that are essential to or inherent in the adjudi-
cative function and powers that are essentially ―ministerial‖ or 
―administrative.‖44 The test reflects a functionalist approach to 
the Constitution which posits that the separation of powers 
bolstered by the non-delegation principle is preserved as long 
as ―core functions‖ of the branches aren‘t transferred from one 
branch to another.45 ―Core functions,‖ in turn, are those func-
tions that must be retained by a branch in order to ensure that 
it is able to function as a separate, co-equal branch of govern-
ment within the Constitution‘s system of checks and balances.46 
Courts applying this test variously characterize Article III‘s 
Vesting Clause and the non-delegation principle, as applying 
only to functions that are ―strictly judicial‖ or ―core judicial 
functions.‖47 Since delegating ―ministerial‖ or ―administrative‖ 
functions assertedly does not threaten the judiciary‘s exercise 
of ―the judicial Power,‖ as that phrase is used in Article III‘s 
Vesting Clause, Article III‘s nondelegation principle does not 
limit delegations of these functions.48 
 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 
2002) (holding that setting a schedule for restitution payments ―is a core judi-
cial function . . . that the district court may not delegate‖). 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 553 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(―[W]e have upheld a district court‘s limited delegation of authority to a proba-
tion officer where the court gives no affirmative indication that it would not 
retain ultimate authority over all of the conditions of supervised release.‖). 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(―[D]elegating the administrative details to the probation officer [constitutes] a 
permissible delegation.‖); United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 
(11th Cir. 2001) (―We find no improper delegation of judicial authority in this 
case because by ordering the issuance of a summons, the court directed the 
probation officer to perform a ministerial act or support service.‖). 
 45. Eric R. Claeys, Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers 
on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 427–28 
(2004). 
 46. Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The Ap-
pointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1515, 1531 n.58 (1990). 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Turpin, 393 F. App‘x 172, 173 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
 48. See, e.g., Allen, 312 F.3d at 516; Bernardine, 237 F.3d at 1283. 
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Courts and commentators have struggled to distinguish 
core functions from non-core, ministerial, or administrative 
functions.49 Some have tried to formulate and apply a general 
definition of ―core judicial function.‖50 Others have adopted a 
case-by-case approach, limiting application of the core judicial 
function test to particular sets of facts.51 
a. The Definitional Model 
The Supreme Court has never defined ―core judicial func-
tions,‖ except to say that it involves the authority to decide Ar-
ticle III ―cases and controversies.‖52 That, of course, leaves the 
question of what it means to ―decide‖ such actions, to say noth-
ing of the debate about the meaning of ―cases and controver-
sies.‖53 Possibly for those reasons, no circuit court has invoked 
the Court‘s explanation in applying the core judicial functions 
test. 
The Eleventh and First Circuits have offered alternative 
ways of defining core judicial functions. In United States v. 
Nash, the Eleventh Circuit defined core judicial functions as 
determinations about whether a particular condition would at-
tach to a sentence.54 Under the Nash Court‘s approach, then, 
courts may delegate determinations as to when, where, and 
how a sentence should be meted out, but not what the sentence 
itself should be.55 That line is similar to one drawn by the Third 
 
 49. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage 
Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218 (1963) (―The dichotomy between ‗ministeri-
al‘ and ‗discretionary‘ [is] at the least unclear, and one may suspect that it is a 
way of stating rather than arriving at the result.‖); M. Elizabeth Magill, The 
Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136–47 
(2000) (discussing the difficulties in formulating a definition of ―core functions‖ 
in the judicial, legislative, and executive contexts). 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(suggesting that a court delegates a core judicial function when it delegates a 
decision as to ―whether a defendant must abide by a condition‖). 
 51. See, e.g., Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 359–61 (6th Cir. 
2001) (holding that a court‘s delegating to a probation officer the schedule of 
restitution payments is constitutionally permissible). 
 52. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349 (2000). 
 53. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-
International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Juris-
diction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1765, 1811 (2004) (acknowledging the continued vitality of ―an impor-
tant debate about the meaning of the words ‗Cases‘ and ‗Controversies‘ in Ar-
ticle III, Section 2, Clause 1‖). 
 54. 438 F.3d 1302, 1304–06 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 55. Id. at 1306. 
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Circuit, which distinguished between nondelegable decisions 
involving the ―nature or extent of the punishment imposed‖ and 
other, delegable determinations.56 
The First Circuit, by contrast, has sometimes defined core 
judicial functions in terms of the significance of the function be-
ing delegated.57 Under a test announced in United States v. 
York, a decision is nondelegable (i.e. a core judicial function) if 
it is a ―significant penological decision,‖ such as deciding if a 
probationer must undergo specific types of treatment.58 As the 
Tenth Circuit discovered when attempting to employ the York 
test, however, determining exactly how significant a decision 
must be under the York test is oftentimes an exercise in com-
parative analysis, rather than a simple or straightforward ap-
plication of a judicial standard.59 
b. The Case-by-Case model 
Other circuit courts have employed an incremental, case-
by-case approach to marking out some sort of line to determine 
whether a function is a core judicial function.60 Courts using 
this approach have said, for example, that determining the 
number of drug tests a probationer must undergo61 and deter-
mining whether a probationer must participate in a mental 
health treatment program62 are both nondelegable core judicial 
functions, whereas determining the details of a probationer‘s 
participation in a mental health treatment program63 and de-
termining certain details of a probationer‘s visitation privileges 
 
 56. See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 58. Id. As this example makes clear, in practice, the First Circuit‘s test is 
frequently indistinguishable from the ―whether‖ test. 
 59. See United States v. Huffman, 146 F. App‘x 939, 945 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(―The delegation of authority in Huffman‘s case falls somewhere between the 
forbidden delegation of a ‗significant penological decision‘ . . . and [a] permit-
ted delegation of authority . . . .‖). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (―If 
[the defendant] is required to participate in a mental health intervention only 
if directed to do so by his probation officer, then this special condition consti-
tutes an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the probation officer. 
On the other hand, if the District Court [intends] nothing more than to dele-
gate to the probation officer details with respect to the selection and schedule 
of the program, such delegation was proper.‖ (citations omitted)).  
 61. United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 883 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 62. United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 63. United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 409–11 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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with his son and grandson64 are delegable non-core judicial 
functions. 
The incremental approach has the virtue of clearly demar-
cating the legality of certain types of delegations within a given 
circuit.65 However, different circuits applying this approach of-
ten reach divergent conclusions on essentially the same facts.66  
2. The Ultimate Authority Test 
Courts also regularly evaluate challenges to the constitu-
tionality of delegations to probation officers by distinguishing 
between supervised and unsupervised delegations of judicial 
authority.67 Depending on the extent to which an Article III 
court retains ultimate power over a probation officer‘s use of 
judicially delegated authority, courts may decide that the judi-
cial branch has not delegated anything—at least not in a mea-
ningful way.68 
Courts applying the ultimate authority test generally agree 
that the nondelegation principle is not violated where, 
the district court does not disclaim ultimate responsibility for decid-
ing the appropriateness of a sentence . . . [making it] likely that the 
probation officer will consult with the court about the matter or, at a 
minimum, [that] the court will entertain a motion from the defendant 
for reconsideration of the probation officer‘s initial decision.69 
In other words, so long as appeal is not foreclosed—by the 
court either expressly disclaiming responsibility for deciding 
the appropriateness of a sentence or refusing to entertain a mo-
tion for reconsideration of the probation officer‘s initial deci-
sion—Article III courts retain ultimate authority over judicial 
power and there has been no unconstitutional delegation.70 The 
 
 64. United States v. Bowman, 175 F. App‘x 834, 838 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Figuereo, 404 F.3d 537, 542–43 (1st Cir. 
2005) (resolving petitioner‘s constitutional claim in three sentences by refer-
ence to a prior decision). 
 66. Compare Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 
1998) (holding that courts may delegate to probation officers the power to set 
the amount and timing of restitution payments), with United States v. Miller, 
77 F.3d 71, 77–78 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that courts may not delegate to pro-
bation officers the power to set the amount and timing of restitution payments). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808–09 (4th Cir. 
1995) (finding that a grant of authority was not an unconstitutional delegation 
because the district court ―retain[ed] the right to review findings and to exer-
cise ultimate authority for resolving the case or controversy‖). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 229 F. App‘x 172, 178 (3d Cir. 
2007); United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 69. United States v. Wynn, 553 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 175 F. App‘x 834, 838 (9th Cir. 
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courts‘ ability to exercise that authority, however, may depend 
on a probationer‘s decision to appeal.71 
Courts applying the ultimate authority test look at orders 
or conditions imposed by probation officers made pursuant to 
judicial delegation as essentially advisory in the sense that 
they are not final.72 After all, according such orders or condi-
tions the weight of final authority would potentially run afoul 
of both the individual‘s right to have certain claims heard by an 
Article III court and the principle of separation of powers (inso-
far as that principle requires any final and binding action to be 
taken by an Article III court).73 
E. THE SUPREME COURT‘S WELL-SETTLED ARTICLE I 
DELEGATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Article III‘s Vesting Clause is not the only vesting clause in 
the Constitution. Articles I and II each have a Vesting Clause, 
and each clause bears a strong similarity in form and function 
to Article III‘s Vesting Clause.74 Comparing Article III‘s Vest-
ing Clause to its Article I counterpart is particularly instruc-
tive, since there is a relatively large, jurisprudentially consis-
tent body of case law surrounding the Article I Vesting 
Clause.75 
Just as grants of judicial authority must conform to Article 
III‘s nondelegation principle, grants of legislative power must 
conform to Article I‘s nondelegation principle.76 Article I‘s non-
delegation principle is based in the text of Article I‘s Vesting 
 
2006) (finding that the nondelegation principle was not offended where, upon 
issuance of an unfavorable recommendation by his probation officer, Bowman 
was ―free to seek relief from the district court‖). 
 71. See, e.g., Wynn, 553 F.3d at 1120. 
 72. See Bowman, 175 F. App‘x at 838. 
 73. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849–
51, 857 (1986) (holding a delegation of judicial power constitutional because 
the ―essential attributes of judicial power‖ were retained by an Article III 
court and because the petitioner had waived his individual right to an Article 
III determination of the legal question at issue). 
 74. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (―The judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court . . . .‖), with U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 1 (―All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States . . . .‖), and U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (―The executive Power shall 
be vested in a President of the United States of America.‖). 
 75. See Lawson, supra note 31, at 355–72 (exploring the history of the 
nondelegation doctrine from 1825 to 2002). 
 76. See United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 
(1932) (―That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of 
course, clear.‖). 
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Clause, which provides that ―All legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States . . . .‖77  
Despite the similarities in the language of the Vesting 
Clauses of Articles I and III, the standard governing courts‘ ap-
plication of Article I‘s nondelegation principle is simpler and 
more straightforward than its Article III counterpart. Since the 
early twentieth century, the Court‘s Article I nondelegation ju-
risprudence has been governed exclusively by the intelligible 
principle standard,78 in contrast to the multiplicity of ap-
proaches applied to Article III nondelegation jurisprudence.79 
Under the intelligible principle standard, if a statutory delega-
tion of rulemaking authority provides an intelligible principle 
to limit the discretion of the person or entity exercising the de-
legated power, then the delegation itself is non-legislative and, 
thus, constitutional.80  
As a number of justices have pointed out, many of the ―in-
telligible principles‖ recognized by a court do little, if anything, 
to actually constrain discretion.81 In practice, the intelligible 
principle standard has proven to be a blank check for Congress 
to delegate its powers.82 Only twice has the Court held delega-
 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 78. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); 
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
 79. Compare Bryan Clark, Refining the Nondelegation Doctrine in Light of 
Real ID Act Section 102(c): Time to Stop Bulldozing Constitutional Barriers for 
a Border Fence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 851, 859 n.64 (2009) (noting the Supreme 
Court‘s ―rote recitation, at least in modern cases, of the intelligible principle 
requirement . . . while ultimately reaching what has become a foregone con-
clusion—‗that the delegation meets the standard‘‖ (quoting Ronald J. Krotos-
zynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the 
Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 239, 261–65 (2005))), 
with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, 
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 933 (1988) (―[T]he Court‘s [Article III 
nondelegation] methodology is underdeveloped, its standards obscure. Judges, 
legislators, and lawyers would profit from increased clarity and coherence.‖). 
 80. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 776–77 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989). 
 81. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487–88 (Stevens, J., concurring); Mis-
tretta, 488 U.S. at 415–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 82. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 87 (4th ed. 
2002) (―The Court has become increasingly candid in recognizing its inability 
to enforce any meaningful limitation on Congress‘s power to delegate its legis-
lative power to an appropriate institution.‖). 
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tions of legislative power unconstitutional,83 and it has routine-
ly upheld delegations under statutory standards that are ex-
tremely broad84 or contradictory.85 The intelligible principle 
test is so permissive that, today, the Article I nondelegation 
doctrine is widely considered a dead letter.86 
Courts and commentators criticize the permissiveness of 
the intelligible principle test as having the potential to under-
mine representative democracy by allowing unelected bureau-
crats to exercise a vast array of government powers.87 But they 
also acknowledge that the intelligible principle test enhances 
efficiency by allowing Congress to delegate policy decisions to 
experts in the relevant fields and avoid many of the problems 
inherent in collective action.88 
Given the similarities in language and structure between 
Article I‘s Vesting Clause and Article III‘s Vesting Clause, 
courts might have been expected to draw on the established Ar-
ticle I nondelegation jurisprudence in developing Article III 
nondelegation jurisprudence.89 Instead, lower courts have gone 
a different direction, bypassing the intelligible principle test in 
favor of variations of the core judicial function test and the ul-
 
 83. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549–51 
(1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432–33 (1935). 
 84. See PIERCE, supra note 82, at 93, 96.  
 85. See, e.g., id. at 89–90 (citing the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (1982), as a ―fertile source‖ for ―inherently incon-
sistent‖ standards).  
 86. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictator-
ship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1821 (2010) (―[T]he 
nondelegation doctrine died an unceremonious death, and the modern con-
servative Court has been unwilling to disinter it.‖ (footnote omitted)). But see 
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2003) 
(expressing doubt that the nondelegation doctrine is a thing of the past). 
 87. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep‘t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 
U.S. 607, 686 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (―[T]his Court should once 
more take up its burden of ensuring that Congress does not unnecessarily del-
egate important choices of social policy to politically unresponsive administra-
tors.‖). 
 88. See PIERCE, supra note 82, at 98–99. 
 89. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Con-
stitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158 
n.12 (1992) (noting the similarities in the three Vesting Clauses but declining 
to ―address the implications of the Article II and Article III [nondelegation] 
debates for Article I‖). 
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timate authority test.90 These tests too, however, have proved 
to be difficult to apply consistently and are plagued by prob-
lems of interpretation. 
II.  CRITICIZING THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR 
EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDICIAL 
DELEGATIONS TO PROBATION OFFICERS   
Despite the widespread use of the core judicial function 
test and the ultimate authority test, both tests have significant 
shortcomings. The core judicial function test is fatally impre-
cise. The ultimate authority test is problematic because it does 
not specify a point beyond which delegated authority is too far 
removed from its judicial source. Given these flaws, it is not 
surprising that courts have struggled to apply the two tests 
consistently. 
A. FLAWS IN THE CORE JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS TEST 
The problem with the core judicial functions test is that 
there is no truly helpful, generally accepted definition of a 
―core‖ judicial function.91 Article III speaks only of ―the judicial 
Power‖ and offers no guidance as to what a ―core‖ function 
might be.92 As noted above, the Supreme Court has gone only 
slightly further, saying that the judiciary‘s ―core function‖ is ―to 
decide ‗cases and controversies properly before [it].‘‖93 The 
Court has offered no guidance as to what specific powers or de-
terminations are essential or integral to deciding cases and 
controversies. 
Scholars‘ attempts to identify those functions at the ―core‖ 
of ―the judicial Power‖ are of similarly little help. Formalists—
who view the Constitution as strictly compartmentalizing spe-
 
 90. See Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private 
Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 187–99 
(1989). 
 91. See, e.g., Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of 
Authority to Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling 
Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 419 (2000) (recognizing that the ―‗core func-
tions‘ of each branch‖ are ―ill defined‖); Letter from Edmund Randolph, Gov-
ernor of Va., to Speaker of Va. House of Delegates (Oct. 10, 1787), in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 123, 127 (Max Farrand, 
ed., rev. ed. 1966) ( listing the Constitution‘s deficiencies ―[i]n limiting and de-
fining the judicial power‖). 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 93. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349–50 (2000) (quoting United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20 (1960)). 
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cific powers94—often find themselves, when pressed, at a loss to 
say exactly what those powers are.95 Even Justice Antonin Sca-
lia, ―the leading judicial formalist of our day,‖96 has observed, 
[W]hile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably 
a fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an ele-
ment readily enforceable by the courts. Once it is conceded, as it must 
be, . . . that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy 
considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to 
the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation be-
comes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of de-
gree.97 
Functionalists—who emphasize that the three branches of 
government commonly exercise ―shared and overlapping pow-
ers, as well as separate powers‖98—are more candid in ac-
knowledging the difficulty of defining exactly what constitutes 
a ―core‖ function of a particular branch.99 Nevertheless, some 
functionalists insist that ―core‖ functions exist.100 The most 
common functionalist definition of ―core‖ functions is that they 
are those functions that are vital to preserving the system of 
checks and balances and to ensuring that each branch of gov-
ernment is independent of, and co-equal with, its counter-
parts.101 But, as applied in the judicial context, this definition 
 
 94. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
101 (1995) (―[T]he Court‘s role in separation-of-powers cases is to be limited to 
determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the definition 
of that branch‘s constitutionally derived powers . . . .‖). 
 95. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377, 1390 n.47 (1994) (―I do not think I can attempt to ad-
dress here the very difficult question of whether to seek the original meaning 
of [the terms executive, legislative, or judicial], their present day meaning, or 
their original meaning as ‗translated‘ into the present day world.‖).  
 96. Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
89, 91 (1995). 
 97. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J.,  
dissenting). 
 98. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of 
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 608–09 (2001). 
 99. Id. at 613 (―Functionalist commentators, for their part, leave the three 
categories of governmental power undefined, including the identification of the 
‗core‘ functions of each of the departments.‖). 
 100. E.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separa-
tion of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 642–43 (1984). 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (reflecting 
the functionalist view that, in resolving separation of powers disputes, the 
Court must ―preserve the essential functions‖ of the judiciary); John Devlin, 
Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators 
and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1205, 1213 (1993); Letter from William French Smith, Att‘y Gen. of the 
U.S., to Strom Thurmond, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 6, 
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is susceptible of multiple interpretations. What one court finds 
to be a function essential to the preservation of the judiciary as 
a co-equal branch of government, another court might not deem 
essential.102 
The problems inherent in defining a ―core‖ function are il-
lustrated by the Eleventh and First Circuits‘ attempts to do so. 
As applied by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Nash, 
the core function test distinguishes between ―whether‖ a crimi-
nal defendant will have to do something—which is deemed a 
determination involving a ―core judicial function‖—and ―when, 
where, or how‖ a sentence will be performed—which determi-
nations are not ―core judicial functions.‖103 But the ―whether‖ 
distinction is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the 
―whether‖ test is exceedingly subjective; what strikes one judge 
as a determination about ―whether‖ might strike another as a 
determination about ―where‖ or ―when.‖ For example, a deter-
mination as to whether a probationer may work around child-
ren could easily be rephrased as a determination of where the 
probationer may work. The inherent manipulability of the 
―whether‖ standard means that, aside from perhaps the deter-
mination of ―whether‖ a defendant is guilty or innocent—a de-
cision so obviously encompassed within ―the judicial Power‖ 
that few would debate it—nearly all other ―whether‖ decisions 
regarding sentencing can be rephrased in ways that transform 
them into decisions that are delegable because they merely fill 
in the ―when, where, and how‖ details. 
A second problem with the ―whether‖ standard is that it 
fails to reflect the individual-rights aspect of Article III‘s nonde-
legation principle. Recall that Article III‘s nondelegation prin-
ciple protects two interests: the national interest in separation 
of powers and the individual‘s interest in the protections pro-
vided by a hearing before and decision by an Article III 
judge.104 Circuit courts applying the ―whether‖ standard have 
 
1982), in 128 CONG. REC. 9092, 9093–97 (1982) (―Congress may 
not, . . . consistent with the Constitution, make ‗exceptions‘ to Supreme Court 
Jurisdiction which would intrude upon the core functions of the Supreme Court 
as an independent and equal branch in our system of separation of powers.‖). 
 102. Compare United States v. Mangan, 306 F. App‘x 758, 761 (3d Cir. 
2009) (holding unconstitutional a delegation to a probation officer of the dis-
trict court‘s authority to require a probationer to enroll in a mental health 
treatment program), with United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 
2005) (upholding a delegation to a probation officer of the district court‘s author-
ity to require probationer to enroll in mental health treatment program). 
 103. United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 104. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 
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devoted little time or attention to the standard‘s constitutional 
underpinnings.105 It can be reasonably argued, however, that 
the test is consistent with separation of powers principles, since 
it reserves for the courts what is potentially the most important 
judicial function: deciding if punishment is appropriate in the 
first place and, in broad terms, what sort of punishment is ap-
propriate.106  
But satisfying the separation of powers function does not 
guarantee that the nondelegation principle‘s other key func-
tion—protecting individual rights—is also satisfied. An indi-
vidual‘s right to a judicial determination of his sentence argua-
bly is not limited to determination of ―whether‖ 
considerations.107 In the probation context, for example, details 
like when, where, and how can have a major impact on the  
character and inconvenience of a sentence.108 Yet the ―whether‖ 
test leaves such decisions outside the scope of the nondelega-
tion principle‘s protections and, thus, leaves defendants at the 
mercy of decisionmakers not subject to Article III‘s require-
ments.109 
The First Circuit‘s ―significant penological decision‖ in 
United States v. York110 fares no better than Nash under scru-
tiny. In York, the First Circuit essentially distinguished core 
and non-core functions by asking whether the delegation impli-
cated a ―significant penological decision.‖111 But there is no ob-
jective definition of ―significant penological decision.‖112 What is 
 
(1986). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808–09 (1995) (devot-
ing just one paragraph to the constitutional implications of a district court‘s 
delegation to a probation officer). 
 106. As a matter of logic, without an initial determination as to ―whether‖ 
to impose a sentence, determinations as to ―how, when, and where‖ are unne-
cessary and meaningless. The opposite is not true. For example, a decision 
that the defendant will serve a life sentence in prison is enforceable without 
any more detail. 
 107. See Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) (ruling 
that probationers have a right to a judicial determination that conditions of 
their probations are reasonably related to their rehabilitation or to the protec-
tion of the public). 
 108. Consider, for example, a determination that the probationer cannot 
work within two miles of a school. Such a requirement can dramatically limit 
a probationer‘s ability to find employment. 
 109. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 110. 357 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 111. Id. at 21. 
 112. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989) (holding that 
the legitimacy of a penological interest is determined by a ―reasonableness in-
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―significant‖ to one court might not appear ―significant‖ to 
another.113 The Supreme Court has tried to apply a similar 
―substantiality‖ approach in other contexts and has ultimately 
rejected that approach as unworkable.114 
Moreover, the York test does not indicate from whose pers-
pective the substantiality of the interest is to be assessed.115 
From the separation of powers perspective, maybe the court‘s 
institutional interest in protecting its power relative to the oth-
er two branches should be the focal point.116 But because the 
nondelegation doctrine has also been recognized as a safeguard 
for the individual‘s right to a fair trial,117 it might be argued 
that ―substantial‖ should be defined with reference to the de-
fendant‘s interest. The York test leaves this question  
unanswered.118 
The difficulty faced by courts in defining ―core judicial 
functions‖ is underscored by the fact that courts confronting es-
sentially the same facts have arrived at different conclusions 
about whether a delegation of authority implicates a core judi-
cial function. For example, the Third and Fifth Circuits were 
each recently asked to decide whether a district court could 
constitutionally delegate to a probation officer the authority to 
determine whether a probationer would be required to partici-
 
quiry‖ guided by a number of subjective standards). 
 113. Compare Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 194, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(upholding federal prison system‘s limitation on availability of material known 
to be ―sexually explicit or featur[ing] nudity‖ on grounds that the limitation 
furthered ―legitimate and neutral goals‖), with Mauro v. Arpaio, 147 F.3d 
1137, 1142–44 (9th Cir. 1998) (invalidating a county prison system‘s ban on 
possession of all materials containing ―any graphic representation of frontal 
nudity‖ for not furthering ―legitimate penological interests‖), vacated, 188 F.3d 
1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 114. See, e.g., Kathleen Taylor, Note, The Substantial Impact Test: Victim 
of the Fallout from Vermont Yankee?, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 118, 118–19 
(1984) (referencing the ―abandonment of substantial impact analysis‖ in ad-
ministrative law). 
 115. See, e.g., Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1993) (identifying a 
nondelegation argument as potentially raising both separation of powers and 
personal rights issues). 
 116. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449–453 (1998) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring) (emphasizing the nondelegation doctrine‘s central role in 
protecting the separation of powers).  
 117. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
848 (1986) (recognizing that Article III guarantees litigants the personal 
rights to have their claims adjudicated by judges endowed with certain protec-
tions of judicial independence). 
 118. See United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2004) (neglecting 
to discuss whose perspective the substantiality of the interest is to be assessed). 
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pate in a medical treatment program.119 Despite being con-
fronted with the same question and virtually the same facts, 
the two courts reached opposite conclusions.120 
In the end, attempts to define ―core judicial functions‖ have 
been no more successful than attempts to define ―the judicial 
Power.‖121 Both concepts have defied objective definition. And 
while courts can apply the core judicial functions test with a 
fair degree of certainty to the most obvious cases involving the 
exercise of judicial authority—for example, finding a defendant 
guilty or innocent is clearly a core judicial function—the test 
does not resolve the more difficult questions at the margins, 
which are the hard questions so often litigated.122  
B. FLAWS IN THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY TEST 
The ultimate authority test fares no better than the core 
judicial functions test under critical analysis. Consider, for ex-
ample, its proponents‘ claim that the ultimate authority test 
adequately protects an individual‘s right to a hearing before an 
Article III tribunal.123 The cost of appeal undermines that as-
sertion. With the exception of indigent criminal defendants, 
who are not required to bear the court costs of an appeal,124 
other criminal defendants must bear some—if not all—of the 
considerable costs of challenging a probation officer‘s decision 
on appeal.125 Faced with this prospect, many low-income, but 
non-indigent, probationers may simply forgo their constitution-
 
 119. United States v. Bishop, 603 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Mangan, 306 F. App‘x 758, 761 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 120. Compare Mangan, 306 F. App‘x at 761 (holding delegation to proba-
tion officer unconstitutional), with Bishop, 603 F.3d at 281–82 (upholding del-
egation to probation officer).  
 121. See, e.g., Magill, supra note 98, at 612–13. 
 122. Id. at 614–15 (explaining that definitions of ―core‖ functions fall short 
at the margins). 
 123. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 79, at 937–42 (arguing that nondelegation 
protects both the public interest in separation of powers and the individual 
litigant‘s interest in a fair trial).  
 124. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (―Destitute defendants 
must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money 
enough to buy transcripts.‖). 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Gering, 716 F.2d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that, because the district court had found the defendant non-indigent, 
all cost items assessed by that court were rightfully imposed on the defendant, 
consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1918); United States v. Green, 144 F.R.D. 631, 638 
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (requiring the government to pay the cost of copying docu-
ments and tapes for indigent defendants, but not for non-indigent defendants). 
 2011] DELEGATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 325 
 
al right to a hearing before an Article III tribunal,126 rather 
than pursue a costly and time-consuming appeal.127 To rely 
upon the appellate process as the safeguard of Article III judi-
cial review of probation officers‘ decisions is to ignore the reali-
ty that this protection is effectively denied to individuals who 
lack the resources to adequately fund an appeal.128 
Where defendants are willing and able to appeal conditions 
imposed by probation officers, an entirely different problem 
arises: the ultimate authority test promotes a flood of appeals 
in an era when our judicial system is already severely overbur-
dened.129 The test is effective in protecting probationers‘ consti-
tutional rights to judicial review only to the extent that proba-
tioners exercise their right to appeal.130 In essence, the test 
works only if probationers are incentivized to pursue their right 
to an appeal since, otherwise, probationers effectively surrend-
er at least part of their right to a sentence determined by an 
Article III tribunal. But encouraging additional appeals at a 
time when courts are already chronically overworked is not 
good policy.131 In 2009, for example, almost 58,000 appeals 
were filed in the federal circuit courts.132 Consistent application 
of the ultimate authority test stands only to increase that num-
ber. 
The problem of increased judicial workload is exacerbated 
by the fact that some percentage of the appeals will inevitably 
 
 126. See United States v. Dobey, 751 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1985) (recogniz-
ing that a criminal defendant has the right to a disposition of his case by an 
Article III judge). 
 127. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 
377 n.43 (1985) (―[T]he effort and expense of an appeal deters some from ap-
pealing meritorious claims.‖); see also Paula R. Markowitz & Walter I. Sum-
merfield, Jr., Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1182, 1216 (1952). 
 128. Bruce J. Havighurst & Peter MacDougall, Note, The Representation of 
Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
579, 588 n.31 (1963) (―It may be that persons on the borderline of indigency 
presently obtain the least adequate representation.‖). 
 129. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 n.23 (1975) (―Criminal 
justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases and the complexities of 
our system . . . . A constitutional doctrine requiring [additional] adversary 
hearings . . . could exacerbate the problem of . . . delay.‖). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 553 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 131. See, e.g., Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122 n.23. 
 132. U.S. Court of Appeals–Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. COURTS, http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa2009.pl (select ―NATIONAL 
TOTALS‖ from drop-down menu; then follow ―Generate‖ hyperlink) ( last vi-
sited Oct. 21, 2011). 
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be frivolous.133 As with other grounds for appeal, some proba-
tioners will likely use the option to appeal the imposition of cer-
tain conditions by probation officers as another way to frustrate 
implementation of their sentence.134 The ultimate authority 
test, then, is posited on necessary assumptions that have the 
undesirable systemic effect of additionally burdening the judi-
cial system in the name of ensuring preservation of ―the judi-
cial Power.‖ 
When considering the systemic impact of application of the 
ultimate authority test, it is also helpful to consider the basic 
purposes of delegation to probation officers. Delegating courts 
often cite the use of probation officers as a means of increasing 
judicial efficiency.135 But, by requiring appellate courts to re-
view the imposition of conditions by a probation officer, the ul-
timate authority test does nothing to further—and arguably 
cuts back on—the efficiency of such delegations.136 Rather than 
taking certain decisionmaking functions out of the hands of Ar-
ticle III courts, the ultimate authority test just shifts the bur-
den from district courts onto appellate courts or other district 
courts.137 If the goal is judicial efficiency, giving decisionmaking 
responsibilities to probation officers, whose decisions must be 
reviewed by an Article III court to have any final and binding 
effect, appears counterproductive. 
The biggest problem with the ultimate authority test, 
though, is that its rationale extends logically to sanction dele-
gations of nearly any judicial power by a district court. If the 
Article III Vesting Clause is construed to require only that 
 
 133. Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-
Century Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 459, 472 (2009) (recognizing that many 
criminal appeals are filed for ―hopeless‖ or frivolous reasons). 
 134. Cf. Charles B. Radlauer, Note, A Clash of Power and Jurisdiction: The 
United States Supreme Court v. The International Court of Justice, 11 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 489, 512 (1999) (noting that it ―is in the interest of all death 
row inmates . . . to frustrate [the justice system‘s goal of limiting unnecessary 
delay and abuse] by prolonging the appeals process indefinitely‖). A similar set 
of incentives, albeit involving less serious consequences, operate in the context 
of delaying the imposition of conditions on probation. 
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 
2001) (―For purposes of efficiency, district courts ‗must be able to rely as ex-
tensively as possible on the support services of probation officers.‘‖ (quoting 
United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1995))). 
 136. See CATHARINE M. GOODWIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 
§ 10:8 (2011 ed. 2011). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 77–78 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(noting that the ultimate authority test required court approval of a probation 
officer‘s determination of the amount of restitutionary installment payments). 
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some Article III courts have the power to hear an appeal re-
garding a given governmental action,138 virtually any decision 
regarding an individual‘s rights could be delegated, at least in-
itially, to a non-Article III authority, given the broad reach of 
judicial review.139  
Despite this logical corollary, courts applying the ultimate 
authority test have struck down a significant number of delega-
tions as unconstitutional.140 For example, the Fourth Circuit 
determined that a district court‘s delegation to a probation of-
ficer to determine the amount of and schedule for restitution 
payments by a probationer did not satisfy the ultimate authori-
ty test.141 Yet, the condition of probation at issue in that case 
was reviewable by an Article III court, since the probationer 
could have appealed the imposition of the condition to the court 
of appeals.142 Courts applying the ultimate authority test at 
least implicitly recognize, then, that the availability of appel-
late review is not always sufficient to rescue an otherwise un-
constitutional delegation. Consistent with precedent, there 
must be a point at which reviewability does not save a delega-
tion from Article III‘s nondelegation principle.143 The problem 
with the ultimate authority test is that it does not provide any 
guidance as to what that point might be. 
The current standards for enforcing Article III‘s nondelega-
tion principle are logically and practically unsatisfactory. It is 
 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 175 Fed. App‘x. 834, 838 (9th Cir. 
2006) (explaining that the availability of appeal to an Article III court was suffi-
cient to render a court‘s grant of authority to a probation officer constitutional). 
 139. See GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 136 (noting that courts always retain 
ultimate authority over restitution decisions in the context of probation); see, 
e.g., C.A. Gavilondo, Sabine River Authority v. Department of Interior: NE-
PA’s Applicability to Federal Inaction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 560, 564 (1992) (noting 
that the requirements for bringing a suit in federal court, following an agency 
action, ―traditionally have proven relatively easy to satisfy‖). 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 141. See United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 142. The Fourth Circuit held that because the district court, itself, did not 
retain authority over the decisions, the ultimate authority test was not satis-
fied. See id. But Article III‘s Vesting Clause does not contain any language 
suggesting that a specific type of Article III court must decide federal criminal 
cases. Rather, it requires only that some Article III court have the capacity to 
decide them. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Sepa-
rating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 210–11 
(1985). 
 143. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the 
Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 667–70 (2004) 
(―[T]he appellate review approach is embarrassed by a variety of factors.‖). 
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time to look elsewhere for a workable judicial test. That ―else-
where‖ is the intelligible principle standard. 
III.  BACK TO THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE STANDARD   
Courts are consistently unable to coherently reconcile Ar-
ticle III‘s nondelegation doctrine with the judiciary‘s growing 
need to delegate responsibilities. The reason is that those two 
imperatives—nondelegation and the need to delegate—lie at 
opposite ends of a single spectrum, such that choosing more of 
one necessarily means having less of the other. Not surprising-
ly, when courts try to satisfy both, the resulting tests are not 
only confusing, but frequently inconsistent.144 
Using probation officers in a way that saves judicial re-
sources necessarily entails diminished Article III oversight and 
control over the probation officers‘ assigned tasks. Efficiency 
means giving probation officers more discretionary authority, 
which is only possible under a less stringent reading of the lim-
its of Article III‘s Vesting Clause. But how loosely should the 
Vesting Clause be read? What is the minimum involvement 
that we ought to require of an Article III Court with respect to 
decisions made by probation officers (or any other non-Article 
III official)?  
Given the similarities between the Article III Vesting 
Clause and its Article I counterpart, the logical starting point is 
the intelligible principle standard described earlier.145 Recog-
nizing and applying that standard would not only be more in-
tellectually consistent and coherent than the current approach, 
but would also permit courts to follow the Constitution and ad-
just their use of probation officers to accommodate modern 
needs. 
A. THE INTERPRETIVE ARGUMENT FOR APPLYING THE 
INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE STANDARD 
The Vesting Clauses that give rise to both Article I‘s and 
Article III‘s nondelegation principles are virtually identical—
using basically the same language and having basically the 
same structure.146 That suggests they be given similar effect. 
 
 144. See supra Part II. 
 145. See supra Part I.E. 
 146. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (―All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .‖), with U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 1 (―The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme Court . . . .‖). 
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Article I nondelegation is informed by the same concerns—
protection of individual rights and liberties and separation of 
powers—as Article III nondelegation.147 The few differences 
that do exist between the two Vesting Clauses are largely se-
mantic or stylistic.148 Thus, the same standard courts apply to 
evaluate delegations of Article I power—the intelligible prin-
ciple standard—should, logically, apply to delegations of Article 
III power.149  
Moreover, to the extent there are differences in how the 
Constitution allocates Article I power versus how it allocates 
Article III power, those differences tend to support the idea 
that Article III power should be more delegable than Article I 
power, not less (as it is under the current judicial analysis). For 
example, Article III gives Congress substantial power to struc-
ture the federal court system and strip federal courts of juris-
diction over a significant array of subjects.150 Nothing in Article 
I, by contrast, allows another branch to divest Congress of as-
pects of the legislative power therein granted.151 This distinc-
tion is at least consistent with a more generous allowance of 
delegation in an Article III context than is permitted where Ar-
ticle I powers are concerned. 
Any attempt to analogize between delegations of judicial 
power to executive officers and delegations of legislative power 
to executive officers runs headlong into an obvious counter-
argument rooted in a popular misconception of the Framers‘ vi-
sion of the differences between the branches of government. 
Under this view, the president and Congress are the ―political 
 
 147. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450–52 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (recognizing that Article I nondelegation embraces both separa-
tion of powers and individual liberty). 
 148. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern 
Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 487, 530–31 (2007) (arguing that the history of the ―herein 
granted‖ language—contained in Article I‘s Vesting Clause, but not Article 
III‘s Vesting Clause—shows that the Framers considered the different lan-
guage ―stylistic rather than of great interpretive consequence‖). 
 149. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484–85 (1990) (reaffirming the 
general rule of construction that similar terms used in a single legal docu-
ment, akin to a national constitution, should carry similar meanings). 
 150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress the power to create 
and, implicitly, to define the jurisdiction of lower federal courts); U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 1 (same); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (granting Congress the power to 
make exceptions and regulations for the Supreme Court‘s appellate jurisdic-
tion); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 210–13 (1997). 
 151. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
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branches‖ of government designed specifically to act on popular 
concerns.152 The federal courts, by contrast, were deliberately 
made independent of politics because judicial business requires 
impartiality.153 Thus, the argument goes, a transfer of power 
from the judiciary to a political branch is fundamentally differ-
ent from a transfer of power between the two political 
branches, since the Framers deliberately sought to make the 
judicial power totally independent of politics.154 Given those dif-
ferences, it might seem wrong to apply the same standard to 
review delegations of Article III power as is used to review del-
egations of Article I power.155 
This argument‘s weakness is that it is predicated on a bi-
furcation of the branches that has little basis in history or 
theory. Rather than looking at the branches as either politically 
independent or politically dependent, the Framers envisioned 
different government actors as existing along a single conti-
nuum of political accountability, with some actors more accoun-
table than others.156 This is why James Madison distinguished 
between representatives (who he saw as the most politically ac-
countable actors) and senators (who he described as substan-
tially more independent), even though both categories of official 
perform essentially the same function.157 Lumping the ―political 
 
 152. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (―The central premise of this theory is that the political 
branches of government—Congress, the President, and the state legislatures—
should run the show. Those political institutions—not the courts—have the 
primary responsibility for deciding disputed issues that arise in society.‖). 
 153. E.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1261 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(noting that, whereas the ―political branches‖ are subject to political pressure 
and influence, the Constitution deliberately separates the judiciary from such 
influences, in order to preserve the judiciary‘s impartiality and independence). 
 154. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: 
Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 480 (1997) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court for ―fail[ing] to draw a clear distinction between 
delegations involving the political branches and delegations involving the judi-
cial branch‖). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights 
Act Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1424–25 (1993) (identifying an ―in-
dependence-accountability spectrum‖). 
 157. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 37, at 165–66 (James Madi-
son) (explaining that the House of Representatives and Senate should be ren-
dered separate and distinct so that each would serve as a check on the other); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 37, at 244, (James Madison); see also Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review 
to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1070 (2004) 
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branches‖ together also ignores the institutional differences be-
tween the Executive and the Legislature that, no less than the 
differences between those branches and the Judiciary, animate 
the system of separation of powers.158 Finally, treating the Ju-
diciary as entirely apolitical ignores the numerous and impor-
tant ways in which the Framers sought to make the Judiciary 
at least somewhat accountable to the political process.159 Thus, 
to draw a hard-line distinction between the Judiciary, on the 
one hand, and Congress and the president, on the other, is to 
oversimplify our government.160 
When all three of the branches are perceived as existing 
along a single continuum of political accountability—rather 
than as having been devised to fit within neatly divided com-
partments of accountability or non-accountability—the courts‘ 
delegation of power to executive officials is inherently no more 
problematic than the legislature doing the same thing; each 
type of grant is simply a delegation of power between different-
ly accountable political entities. 
A comparison of Articles I and III and their Vesting Claus-
es, then, provides no basis for making judicial power any less 
delegable than legislative power. Indeed, given the significant 
and substantial similarities between the two clauses, it seems 
reasonable that the intelligible principle test—consistently ap-
plied by Courts, virtually without serious challenge, for more 
than a century in the Article I context161—should apply to Ar-
 
(―[R]epresentatives in two different (and differently accountable) chambers 
have to approve proposals before they can become law.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 158. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2312 (2006) (―American political institutions 
were founded upon the Madisonian assumption of vigorous, self-sustaining 
political competition between the legislative and executive branches. Congress 
and the President would check and balance each other . . . .‖). 
 159. See Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and 
Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 203 n.113 (1996) (cat-
aloguing the many ways in which the political branches influence Article III 
courts); see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Su-
preme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 283–86 (1957), re-
printed in 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 568–71 (2001) (arguing that presidential ap-
pointment and Senate confirmation make the Supreme Court a part of the 
political process and ensure that it does not stray far from prevailing political 
majorities). 
 160. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 16–19 (1985) (suggest-
ing that judges, like congressmen and presidents, are political, rather than 
apolitical—albeit more autonomously political than either of the other two 
branches). 
 161. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1989) (reciting 
the history of the Court‘s application of the intelligible principle standard). 
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ticle III power, as well. If that standard satisfies the constitu-
tional requirements of Article I‘s Vesting Clause, there is no 
reason it should not also satisfy the constitutional require-
ments of Article III‘s Vesting Clause. 
B. THE PRACTICAL ARGUMENT FOR APPLYING THE INTELLIGIBLE 
PRINCIPLE STANDARD 
In the context of probation officers, applying the intelligible 
principle standard would be simple: Courts could constitution-
ally delegate any sentencing decision to a probation officer, as 
long as they announced some intelligible principle to guide the 
exercise of the delegated authority.162 What constitutes an in-
telligible principle could be determined using the same permis-
sive standards the Court has long applied to Article I delega-
tions.163 For example, a judge could say, ―I commit you to 
Probation Officer X for two years, subject to such conditions as 
he deems will most effectively promote the public interest.‖164 If 
Probation Officer X violates his charge upon this delegation, 
the probationer might then appeal imposition of the supposedly 
incorrect condition and might also pursue a claim at law 
against Probation Officer X for damages.165 
Such a standard has the advantage of being both consis-
tent with the Court‘s overall nondelegation jurisprudence and 
more capable of consistent application than the current hodge-
podge of standards that is the judiciary‘s Article III delegation 
jurisprudence.166 It also allows district and appellate courts to 
stem the tide of probation cases brought before them. 
One might ask how a remedy that explicitly allows civil 
suits for injunctive and monetary relief can have the effect of 
 
 162. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928) (describing application of the intelligible principle standard). 
 163. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–75 (2001) 
(discussing the relative permissiveness of the intelligible principle standard). 
 164. The Court has routinely upheld the use of ―public interest‖ standards 
against nondelegation challenges in the Article I context. See Mistretta, 488 
U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―What legislated standard, one must won-
der, can possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have re-
peatedly upheld, in various contexts, a ‗public interest‘ standard?‖). 
 165. See, e.g., Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving a 
prisoner‘s action against his probation officer alleging that the probation offic-
er had acted outside his authority in supervising the prisoner‘s probation). 
 166. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 93 
(1982) (White, J., dissenting) (describing the Court‘s Article III delegation ju-
risprudence as having ―been characterized as one of the most confusing and 
controversial areas of constitutional law‖). 
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limiting litigation. The answer is that most ―intelligible prin-
ciples,‖ as interpreted in the Article I context, have been gen-
erously construed to be extremely permissive, thus suggesting 
that it would be far easier than it is now for reviewing courts to 
dismiss most allegations of probation officer excess as frivo-
lous.167 Courts, already functioning within a judicial system 
burdened by crowded dockets are unlikely to go out of their way 
to look for ways to overturn delegations of judicial authority 
which find some support in the law.168  
But even if it will improve judicial economy, what is to stop 
unelected federal judges from abusing the intelligible principle 
standard in sentencing? After all, in the Article I context, we 
have seen that the intelligible principle standard has rendered 
Article I nondelegation a dead letter.169 There are a number of 
responses to this concern. First, probationers themselves have 
the power to compel judicial review of their sentences. Federal 
law allows probationers to request that courts review or modify 
the terms of their probations.170 Federal courts are constitu-
tionally obligated to consider the substance of such requests, so 
long as they have jurisdiction.171 By moving the courts to re-
evaluate the terms of their probation, probationers can use 
judicial review to check the consequences of excessive judicial 
delegation.  
Moreover, the relative minimization of constitutional con-
straints on judicial delegations to probation officers does not 
mean there will not be any such standards. There are rules and 
statutes, like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines172 and the 
 
 167. See, e.g., Martin, 88 F.3d at 775 (rejecting probationer‘s Bivens action 
as frivolous); Sims v. Dehaan, No. 84-1659, 1985 WL 13404, at *1 (6th Cir. 
June 14, 1985) (affirming dismissal of probationer‘s mandamus petition di-
rected toward his probation officer because the action was ―frivolous and 
[therefore] dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) was appropriate‖). 
 168. Cf. Harris v. City of Cleveland, 7 Fed. App‘x. 452, 457–58 (6th Cir. 
2001) (applying a presumption of qualified immunity to a prisoner‘s Bivens 
claim against a police officer and holding that the prisoner had not established 
his burden of meeting that presumption). 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 81–86. 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 3562 (2006) ( listing the circumstances under which proba-
tion may be modified amended, or appealed). 
 171. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (―[F]ederal 
courts have a virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction 
given them.‖ (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (―[Fed-
eral courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not.‖). 
 172. U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5 (2010). 
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,173 which serve to constrain 
probation officers‘ sentencing authority, even where the Consti-
tution does not. As Professor Kristin Hickman has argued, the 
existence of similar statutory limitations—like the Administra-
tive Procedure Act—is a major reason why courts have been so 
comfortable with the intelligible principle standard in the Ar-
ticle I context.174 
A third response to the criticism is: Consider the alterna-
tive. Yes, the intelligible principle standard is permissive and 
can be a blank check for executive officers to act with the 
courts‘ authority.175 But it is still a consistently enforceable 
standard. The alternative, as illustrated above, is an incoherent 
collection of tests susceptible to all sorts of theoretical and logi-
cal challenges.176 These standards are vulnerable to slippery 
slope problems because they do not offer any well-defined base-
lines from which judges can proceed. What they do offer is the 
illusion of a baseline, on which unsuspecting parties might rely, 
only to find that any stability or consistency is illusory. 
In summary, adopting the intelligible principle standard 
facilitates a number of desirable ends. It brings consistency to 
nondelegation law. It promotes judicial economy. And it brings 
a modicum of judicial consistency to the sentencing process. 
Applying that standard to judicial delegations to probation of-
ficers is a significantly better option than the current, messy 
framework. 
  CONCLUSION   
Criminal law, to a greater extent than is true of other legal 
fields, demands clarity. In no other area of the law does legal 
uncertainty or ambiguity have the potential to bring about such 
profound consequences for individuals‘ lives and liberties.177 
For that reason, and because it impacts hundreds of thousands 
of Americans currently subject to federal probation, parole, or 
 
 173. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 
2017, 2019 (1984). 
 174. Kristin E. Hickman, The Promise and the Reality of U.S. Tax Admin-
istration, in THE DELICATE BALANCE: TAX, DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
39, 41 (Christopher Evans et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2011); see also 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 551–59 (2006). 
 175. PIERCE, supra note 82, at 87. 
 176. See supra Part II. 
 177. See Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the 
Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 66 (1996) (acknowl-
edging ―the unique and profound consequences of the criminal sanction‖). 
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some other form of community supervision,178 the ongoing cir-
cuit split regarding delegation of judicial authority to probation 
officers deserves prompt and decisive resolution. 
Yet, as problematic as is the current circuit split, its exis-
tence provides the opportunity for a much needed advancement 
of the law. By abandoning current standards—with their theo-
retical and logical deficiencies, inconsistencies in application, 
and resulting inefficiencies—and instead applying the intelligi-
ble principle standard, courts can draw a defensible line be-
tween delegation and non-delegation in a way that makes sense 
both in terms of its Constitutional underpinnings and its prac-
tical application. Adopting the intelligible principle standard in 
the probation context would greatly help to eliminate the con-
fusion that currently confronts both courts and probationers, so 
that appellants like Maurice Turpin might finally find some 
certainty regarding their legal rights and obligations. 
 
 178. See GLAZE ET AL., supra note 25, at 23. 
